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PENA-RODRIGUEZ V. COLORADO: ELEVATING A 
CONSTITUTIONAL EXCEPTION ABOVE THE TANNER 
FRAMEWORK 
CAROLINE COVINGTON 
In Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado,1 the Supreme Court of the United 
States addressed whether post-verdict juror testimony about racial bias 
during jury deliberations is a constitutionally mandated exception to Federal 
Rule of Evidence 606(b) (“Rule 606(b)”)2 and its state analogues.3  Although 
jurors are generally barred by the “no-impeachment rule” from testifying 
about the deliberation process to question the validity of the verdict, the Court 
ruled that the Sixth Amendment4 requires that Rule 606(b) give way to allow 
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 1.  137 S. Ct. 855 (2017). 
 2.  FED. R. EVID. 606(b).  The Rule states, in part, that a juror “may not testify about any 
statement made or incident that occurred during the jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on 
that juror’s or another juror’s vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict or 
indictment.”  Id.  For the full text of the Rule, see text accompanying infra note 107.  Rule 606(b) 
is commonly referred to as the “no-impeachment rule” because the losing party is generally 
prohibited from impeaching the verdict through juror testimony about the deliberation process with 
three exceptions.  Kittle v. United States, 65 A.3d 1144, 1147 (D.C. 2013).  
 3.  Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 859.  Forty-two states, including Colorado, have adopted a 
rule or statute modeled after Rule 606(b), which generally prohibits jurors from testifying as to any 
statement made during deliberations if that testimony is offered to challenge the validity of a verdict.  
Benjamin T. Huebner, Beyond Tanner: An Alternative Framework for Postverdict Juror Testimony, 
81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1469, 1487 & n.96 (2006).  Colorado’s Rule 606(b) is practically identical to the 
Federal Rule.  Compare FED. R. EVID. 606(b)(1) (“During an inquiry into the validity of a 
verdict . . . a juror may not testify about any statement made or incident that occurred during the 
jury’s deliberations . . . .”), with COLO. R. EVID. 606(b) (“Upon an inquiry into the validity of a 
verdict . . . a juror may not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the 
jury’s deliberations . . . .”).  
 4.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  The Sixth Amendment states that “the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime 
shall have been committed.”  Id.  
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the trial court to consider evidence of a juror’s reliance on racial animus to 
convict a criminal defendant.5 
The Court correctly held that the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial 
jury should take priority over a rigid application of Rule 606(b) when a jury 
member produces evidence of racially biased statements during 
deliberations.6  As jurisdictions that allow racial bias exceptions demonstrate, 
the Court’s exception will not impede the policy goals advanced in support 
of Rule 606(b).7  First, an exception for juror testimony on racial bias will 
not disrupt the finality of verdicts nor increase post-verdict litigation because 
the Court narrowly tailored the exception to apply only in instances where 
the racial bias cast substantial doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the 
verdict.8  Additionally, courts are already well-equipped to implement 
procedures to receive juror testimony under the Court’s exception that will 
not compromise the privacy of jury deliberations.9  Rule 606(b) already 
permits disclosure under its enumerated exceptions about what happened in 
the jury room if the testimony concerned prejudicial extraneous information 
and outside influence.10  Courts can use these same procedures to receive 
testimony under one of the Rule’s exceptions to receive testimony on racial 
bias within deliberations without significant intrusion into the inner workings 
of the deliberative process.11  The Court’s exception will also not increase 
post-verdict harassment of jurors because of existing professional and local 
rules that restrictively govern contact with jurors.12  Lastly, the Court’s 
decision was correctly decided because it promotes public confidence in the 
fairness of the jury system by allowing consideration of whether racial bias 
affected a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.13 
The Court, however, erred when it failed to adequately base its decision 
on the insufficiency of current procedural safeguards enumerated in United 
States v. Tanner.14  In Tanner, the Court declined to mandate a constitutional 
exception to Rule 606(b), precluding the defendant from introducing juror 
testimony about other jurors’ alleged intoxication and drug use.15  The Court 
reasoned that any Sixth Amendment concerns to Rule 606(b) were addressed 
by four procedural safeguards: voir dire, court and counsel observation of 
                                                          
 5.  Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869. 
 6.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 7.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 8.  See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 9.  See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 10.  See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 11.  See infra Part IV.A.1. 
 12.  See infra Part IV.A.2. 
 13.  See infra Part IV.A.3. 
 14.  483 U.S. 107 (1987); see infra Part IV.B.  
 15.  See infra Part II.C.1  
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jurors, non-juror evidence, and pre-verdict juror testimony.16  Following 
Tanner, the Supreme Court as well as lower courts relied on the Tanner 
procedural safeguards to foreclose any constitutional challenges to Rule 
606(b)’s exclusionary practice of evidence of juror bias during 
deliberations.17  Rather than work within this established Tanner framework, 
the Pena-Rodriguez Court incorrectly reasoned that a constitutional 
exception to Rule 606(b) was necessary to combat systematic racism within 
the criminal justice system.18  As a result of its flawed reasoning, the 
majority’s opinion inadvertently gives rise to a preferential system of bias 
that disregards other types of equally damaging juror bias.19  The Court 
should have decided the case based on the insufficiencies of the Tanner 
safeguards in the context of racial bias to protect a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to an impartial jury.20 
I.  THE CASE 
In May 2007, a man was accused of sexually assaulting two teenage 
sisters in the bathroom of a Colorado horse-racing track.21  The girls 
separately identified an employee of the racetrack, Petitioner Miguel Angel 
Peña-Rodriguez, as the perpetrator.22  Peña-Rodriguez was charged with one 
count of attempted sexual assault on a child younger than fifteen, one count 
of unlawful sexual contact, and two counts of harassment.23  Prior to trial, 
potential jurors were questioned during voir dire24 about whether they could 
be fair and impartial in the case.25  None of the subsequently empaneled jury 
members expressed racial or other bias.26  The jury found Peña-Rodriguez 
                                                          
 16.  See infra Part II.C.1. 
 17.  See infra Part II.C.1. 
 18.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 19.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 20.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 21.  Pena-Rodriguez v. People, 350 P.3d 287, 288 (Colo. 2015), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).  
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Voir dire is the process by which the court evaluates prospective jurors to ensure 
impartiality and suitability for jury service.  Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 127 (1987); see 
Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1982) (“Voir dire plays a critical function in 
assuring the criminal defendant that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury will be 
honored”).  
 25.  Pena-Rodriguez, 350 P.3d at 288.  Potential jurors received written questionnaires asking, 
“Is there anything about you that you feel would make it difficult for you to be a fair juror in this 
case?”  Id.  Additionally, defense counsel asked during voir dire whether “this is simply not a good 
case for [you] to be a fair juror.”  Id.   
 26.  Id.  
 550 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 77:547 
 
guilty of harassment and unlawful sexual contact but failed to reach a verdict 
on attempted sexual assault of a child.27 
After the trial concluded, Petitioner filed a motion for juror contact 
information, alleging that some jury members had made racially biased 
remarks during deliberations.28  After the court ordered Petitioner to allege 
the particular facts of juror bias, Petitioner’s counsel submitted an affidavit 
stating that two jurors told her “some of the other jurors expressed a bias 
toward [Pena-Rodriguez] and [his] alibi witness because they were 
Hispanic.”29  Petitioner’s counsel received the court’s permission to contact 
the jurors and request affidavits recalling the specific instances of bias within 
deliberations.30 Subsequently, Petitioner’s counsel submitted affidavits from 
jurors M.M. and L.T. alleging that another juror, Juror H.C., made racially 
biased comments about Peña-Rodriguez and his alibi witness during jury 
deliberations.31  According to the two jurors, Juror H.C. allegedly said, “I 
think he did it because he’s Mexican and Mexican men take whatever they 
want.”32  Additionally, Juror. H.C. made statements about Mexican men 
being “physically controlling of women because they have a sense of 
entitlement and think they can ‘do whatever they want’ with women.”33  The 
affidavits also alleged that Juror H.C. believed Peña-Rodriguez was guilty 
because “in his experience as an ex-law enforcement officer, Mexican men 
had a bravado that caused them to believe they could do whatever they 
wanted with women” and that “where he used to patrol, nine times out of ten 
Mexican men were guilty of being aggressive toward women and young 
girls.”34  Lastly, Juror H.C. was alleged to have said that he did not think 
Peña-Rodriguez’s alibi witness was credible because “among other things, 
he was ‘an illegal.’”35 
Peña-Rodriguez’s counsel moved for a new trial, but the trial court 
found that H.C.’s comments during jury deliberations were inadmissible 
under Rule 606(b) of the Colorado Rules of Evidence (“CRE 606(b)”).36  The 
court subsequently denied the motion for a new trial, and Peña-Rodriguez 
was sentenced to probation for two years and required to register as a sex 
                                                          
 27.  Id.  
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id.  
 30.  Id. at 289.  
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Id.  
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Id.  
 35.  Id.  
 36.  Id.; COLO. R. EVID. 606(b); see supra note 3.  
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offender.37  Peña-Rodriguez appealed.38  A divided Colorado Court of 
Appeals affirmed the district court’s decision,39 and the Colorado Supreme 
Court affirmed by a 4-3 vote, holding that CRE 606(b) prohibited admission 
of Juror H.C.’s testimony.40  The majority expressed concern that creating an 
exception to CRE 606(b) for racial bias would undermine policy objectives 
that the rule purported to achieve.41  Justice Márquez, joined by Justices Eid 
and Hood, dissented, noting that the majority should have elevated a 
defendant’s fundamental constitutional right to a fair trial over general policy 
interests.42  The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to address 
whether the constitution requires an exception to the no-impeachment rule 
when a juror makes a statement indicating that “racial animus was a 
significant motivating factor in his or her vote to convict.”43 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The United States Constitution guarantees a defendant the right to a trial 
by jury in all criminal proceedings.44  The Sixth Amendment further 
guarantees the criminal defendant the right to an impartial jury, free of 
prejudice and bias.45  An impartial juror has been understood to be one who 
can “lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the 
evidence presented in court.”46  Although the right to a fair and impartial jury 
                                                          
 37.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 6, Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017) (No. 
15-606).  
 38. People v. Pena-Rodriguez, No. 11CA0034, at *2 (Colo. App. Nov. 8, 2012), reh’g denied, 
350 P.3d 287 (Colo. 2015).  
 39.  Id. at *16 (referring to Juror H.C. as “Juror 11”).  
 40.  Pena-Rodriguez v. People, 350 P.3d 287, 287–88 (Colo. 2015), rev’d sub nom. Pena-
Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).  
 41.  Id. at 292–93.  
 42.  Id. at 293–94 (Márquez, J., dissenting). 
 43.  Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 861 (2017).  The Court addressed whether 
the Constitution required an exception to both state and federal codifications of the no-impeachment 
rule, as applied in the case at bar in Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b).  Id.   
 44.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3 (“The Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury; and such Trial 
shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed . . . .”).  The Supreme 
Court, however, has held that the Constitution only requires juries for criminal trials where the 
prospective punishment is more than six months in prison.  Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73–
74 (1970).  
 45.  See supra note 4 for the relevant text of the Sixth Amendment.  See, e.g., McDonough 
Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 554 (1984) (“One touchstone of a fair trial is an 
impartial trier of fact— ‘a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before 
it.’”(quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982))). 
 46.  Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961) (first citing Ex Parte Spies, 123 U.S. 131 (1887); 
then citing Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910); and then citing Reynolds v. United Stated 
98 U.S. 145 (1878)); see, e.g., Buchanan v. Kentucky, 483 U.S. 402, 417 (1987) (“[T]he Court’s 
understanding [is] that jury impartiality requires only ‘jurors who will conscientiously apply the law 
and find the facts.’” (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423 (1985))). 
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is a cornerstone of the American legal system,47 the common law and 
evidentiary rules designed to preserve the integrity of the process have 
shielded the secrecy of jury deliberations.48  When facing allegations of juror 
misconduct, courts will often prohibit jurors from offering testimony that 
would impeach their verdict.49  Section II.A traces the common law 
development of prohibiting post-verdict juror impeachment in American 
jurisprudence as well as the Supreme Court’s early efforts to clarify its 
position on the issue.  Section II.B reviews the codification and legislative 
history of the no-impeachment rule from its early development to adoption 
into the Federal Rules of Evidence.  Lastly, Section II.C examines the 
Supreme Court’s subsequent ruling in Tanner v. United States50 and its 
pervasive influence on lower courts’ interpretations of Rule 606(b). 
A.  The Early Era: Development of the Common Law No-Impeachment 
Rule 
The general rule that prohibited post-verdict juror testimony originated 
from the eighteenth-century English case, Vaise v. Delaval.51  In Vaise, 
English Chief Justice Lord Mansfield heard a case in which a defendant 
attempted to set aside a jury verdict by presenting two juror affidavits 
explaining that the jury had improperly reached a verdict through a game of 
chance.52  Although English courts had consistently allowed jurors’ 
testimony to impeach the verdict without question,53 Lord Mansfield broke 
with tradition and held that the juror affidavits were inadmissible to impeach 
their own verdicts. 54  Lord Mansfield, however, held that the court may 
receive evidence about deliberations from an outside source, such as 
someone who observes the misconduct from a window.55  American courts 
subsequently adopted Lord Mansfield’s decision in Vaise as the Mansfield 
                                                          
 47.  See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.  
 48.  See infra Part II.A.; see also United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 618 (2d Cir. 1997) 
(“[C]ourts and commentators alike recognize that the secrecy of deliberations is essential to the 
proper functioning of juries.”).  
 49.  See infra Part II.C. 
 50.  483 U.S. 107 (1987). 
 51.  (1785) 99 Eng. Rep. 944; 1 T.R. 11; see also State v. Kociolek, 118 A.2d 812, 815 (N.J. 
1955) (“The barrier, apparently insurmountable in its original form however heinous or 
reprehensible the misconduct of the jury, originated with Lord Mansfield’s decision in Vaise v. 
Delaval . . . .”).  
 52.  99 Eng. Rep. at 944. 
 53.  See, e.g., Dent v. Hertford (1696) 91 Eng. Rep. 546; 2 Salkeld 645 (holding that the verdict 
must be set aside and new trial ordered because the jury foreman said the plaintiff should never get 
a verdict in his favor); Philips v. Fowler (1735) 94 Eng. Rep. 994; Barnes 441 (allowing juror 
testimony that the verdict was decided by casting lots to impeach the verdict).   
 54.  Vaise, 99 Eng. Rep. at 944.  
 55.  Id. 
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Rule, which embodied the proposition that all juror testimony is inadmissible 
for purposes of impeaching a verdict.56 
1.  Breaking Mansfield Tradition 
While some early American courts adopted the Mansfield Rule’s 
complete ban on jurors testifying to impeach their own verdict,57 other courts 
embraced modified versions of the ban.  The first variation to gain traction, 
known as the Iowa Rule, arose from a mid-nineteenth century Iowa Supreme 
Court case, Wright v. Illinois & Mississippi Telegraph Co.58  In Wright, four 
jurors offered affidavits alleging that the jury had returned a quotient verdict, 
i.e., a verdict determined by the average of each individual juror’s estimate 
of damages.59  Noting that prior precedent was not based on any standard 
principle, “but upon its own supposed merits,” the Iowa Supreme Court 
created its own rule.60  The court held that affidavits from jurors are 
admissible for purposes of impeaching a verdict if they involve a matter 
which did not “essentially inhere in the verdict itself.”61  Rather than focus 
on the trustworthiness of juror testimony,62 the Iowa court focused on 
whether the testimony was both disruptive to the stability and finality of 
verdicts, as well as irrefutable.63  Affidavits alleging that the jury returned a 
quotient verdict, that a jury determined a verdict by a game of chance, or that 
a juror was improperly approached by a third party were admissible because 
the allegations involved “fact[s] independent of the verdict itself.”64  The 
court reasoned that these allegations could be “readily and certainly 
disproved by his fellow jurors.”65 
                                                          
 56.  See Dorr v. Fenno, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 521, 525 (1832) (“The [Mansfield] rule is now 
perfectly well settled in both countries and may be laid down to be, that the [t]estimony of jurors is 
inadmissible to show their own misbehaviour . . . .”). 
 57.  See, e.g., Pleasants v. Heard, 15 Ark. 403, 407–08, 411 (1855) (finding inadmissible juror 
testimony that damages were determined by average); Murdock v. Sumner, 39 Mass. (22 Pick.) 156, 
157 (1839) (finding juror affidavits stating that they had made a mistake in assessing damages 
inadmissible on motion for a new trial); Clum v. Smith, 5 Hill 560, 560–61 (N.Y. 1843) (holding 
juror testimony inadmissible because it was intended to impeach the verdict on the grounds that the 
jury foreman had left deliberations to consult with outside sources on damages).  
 58.  20 Iowa 195 (1866).  
 59.  Id. at 212 (“[T]he verdict was determined by each juror marking down such sum as he 
thought fit, and dividing the aggregate by twelve and taking the quotient as their verdict . . . .”).  
 60.  Id. at 209.  
 61.  Id. at 210.  
 62.  Id. at 210–13.  The Iowa court dismissed Lord Mansfield’s reasoning about the inability of 
a jury to reliably report its own misconduct and instead offered that “[a]t all events the superior 
opportunities of knowledge and less liability to mistake . . . would entitle his statement to the most 
credit.”  Id. at 211–12. 
 63.  Id. at 211.  
 64.  Id. at 210.  
 65.  Id. at 211. 
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The court distinguished these types of allegations from those allegations 
solely within the juror’s own mind.66  Under the court’s newly created rule, 
misunderstandings of jury instructions or witness testimony during trial, 
mistakes in calculating the verdict, or allegations of influential statements by 
other jurors were held to be inadmissible.67  The Court also noted that while 
public policy does protect those verdicts in which a juror correctly discharges 
his duty, there is no legitimate public policy that can prevent a court from 
considering the best available evidence to remedy unlawful juror 
misconduct.68 
In the years following the Wright decision, several states departed from 
the Mansfield Rule’s broad prohibition on juror impeachment of the verdict.  
While some states adhered to the Iowa Rule,69 others adopted narrower 
interpretations that were less lenient than the Iowa Rule yet more flexible 
than the Mansfield Rule’s blanket prohibition on any juror testimony.70  
Rather than focus on the credibility of juror testimony, the critical factor was 
whether or not the allegations took place outside of jury deliberations or 
within the protected sphere of the jury room.71  Despite these variations, the 
majority of jurisdictions still followed the Mansfield approach by the 
beginning of the twentieth century.72 
2.  The Supreme Court’s Role in the Common Law Development of 
the No-Impeachment Rule 
The United States Supreme Court refrained from directly addressing the 
admissibility of juror testimony under the common law to impeach verdicts 
in United States v. Reid.73  In Reid, the Court confronted two juror affidavits 
that indicated the jurors had read a newspaper article during deliberations on 
the evidence presented at a murder trial.74  Rather than deem these affidavits 
                                                          
 66.  Id. at 210. 
 67.  Id.  
 68.  Id. at 212.  
 69.  The Supreme Court of Kansas determined that a juror’s affidavit alleging drunken behavior 
from another juror during deliberations was admissible under the Iowa Rule because it did not exist 
within the juror’s own mind and was easily verifiable by the court.  Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 539, 
544–45, 546–47 (1874).  
 70.  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Woodward v. Leavitt considered three jurors’ 
testimonies alleging that juror Brown had told them he had already decided in favor of the defendant 
prior to the trial.  107 Mass. 453, 459 (1871).  Conversely, Brown testified that he had actually voted 
for the plaintiff rather than the defendant.  Id. at 459.  The court found that the pretrial testimony 
was admissible because it did not concern the internal deliberation process but that the second 
testimony was inadmissible because “it related to the private deliberations of the jury.”  Id. at 471.  
 71.  Id. at 471. 
 72.  Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 117 (1987).  
 73.  12 How. 361 (1851). 
 74.  Id. at 361–62.  
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inadmissible, the Court held that the defendants were not entitled to a new 
trial because the newspaper article did not influence the jury’s verdict.75  The 
Reid Court neither endorsed the Mansfield rule nor stated a preference for a 
more flexible variation; instead, the Court focused on the benign effect of 
reading the newspaper article prior to issuing a verdict.76  However, the Court 
did caution that “cases might arise in which it would be impossible to refuse 
[juror affidavits] without violating the plainest principles of justice.”77 
In McDonald v. Pless,78 the Supreme Court firmly rejected more lenient 
variations of the Mansfield Rule that had developed in the United States in 
favor of a more restrictive standard.79  The Court held that evidence of a 
jury’s quotient verdict could not be used in this case because the accepted 
rule prohibited losing parties from using juror testimony to impeach the 
verdict.80  Although the Court acknowledged that litigants possessed 
countervailing interests when juries arrived at verdicts based on “arbitrary 
and unjust method[s],”81 the Court defended its adherence to excluding post-
verdict juror testimony by noting it was “the lesser of two evils.”82  In support 
of its conclusion, the Court articulated three overriding policy considerations 
behind upholding the no-impeachment rule.83  First, if jurors were permitted 
to impeach their verdicts, the Court reasoned that all verdicts would be 
challenged by losing parties who would harass the jurors to obtain testimony 
to invalidate the jury’s findings.84  Second, the Court reasoned that admitting 
juror testimony would destroy all frankness and freedom of discussion and 
transform once private deliberations into the subject of constant public 
scrutiny.85  Lastly, the Court reasoned that allowing such testimony would 
undermine the finality of verdicts because it would encourage losing parties 
to launch inquiries after the conclusion of trial.86  The Court reaffirmed that 
it would be imprudent to provide an inflexible rule as there might be cases in 
which juror misconduct is so egregious that it would merit a departure from 
                                                          
 75.  Id. at 366.  
 76.  Id.  The Court did note, “[i]t would perhaps hardly be safe to lay down any general rule 
upon this subject.”  Id. 
 77.  Id.  
 78.  238 U.S. 264 (1915). 
 79.  Id. at 269. 
 80.  Id.  
 81.  Id. at 267.  
 82.  Id.  
 83.  Id. at 267–68.  
 84.  Id. at 267.  
 85.  Id. at 267–68. 
 86.  Id. at 268. 
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the no-impeachment rule as to avoid “violating the plainest principles of 
justice.”87 
A.  The Legislative History of Rule 606(b) 
The Advisory Committee’s original rule in its 1971 Preliminary Draft 
conformed to the Iowa Rule’s division between testimony on the mental 
processes of jurors and testimony about conditions or occurrences that 
improperly influenced the verdict.88  Rather than focus on the location of the 
misconduct, the proposed rule drew a distinction between testimony on 
subjective mental processes and testimony concerning objective 
occurrences.89  This proposed rule would have prohibited jurors from 
testifying about conduct occurring during deliberations but only with respect 
to its effects on the jurors’ thought processes.90  The Advisory Committee 
noted that “the door of the jury room is not necessarily a satisfactory dividing 
point” and that allowing jurors to testify about matters outside of their own 
internal reactions does not jeopardize the values that the Committee sought 
to protect.91 
After reviewing comments and suggestions on the original preliminary 
draft, the Advisory Committee submitted a revised draft to the Supreme 
Court for promulgation in October of 1970.92  The draft was heavily criticized 
by both the Justice Department93 and Senator McClellan94 as dangerously 
subjecting jury deliberations to review after the verdict had been rendered.  
                                                          
 87.  Id. at 268–69 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 147 (1892)).  The Court 
noted that it would not attempt to enumerate or describe those types of circumstances in which a 
departure from the no-impeachment rule would be applied.  Id. at 269.  
 88.  FED. R. EVID. 606(b) advisory committee’s note to 1974 enactment (quoting FED. R. EVID. 
606(b) advisory committee’s note to 1971 draft); see supra notes 58–67 and accompanying text 
(detailing the formation of the Iowa Rule in Wright v. Ill. & Miss. Tel. Co.)  
 89.  See S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 13 (1974).  
 90.  Id.  The rule provided:  
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify 
concerning the effect of anything upon his or any other juror’s mind or emotions as 
influencing him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his 
mental processes in connection therewith. Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any 
statement by him indicating an effect of this kind be received for these purposes.  
46 F.R.D. 161, 289–90 (1969).  
 91.  FED. R. EVID. 606(b) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules.  The Committee 
noted, “[t]he values sought to be promoted by excluding the evidence include freedom of 
deliberation, stability and finality of verdicts, and protection of jurors against annoyance and 
embarrassment.”  Id. (citing McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915)).  
 92.  H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 3 (1973).  
 93.  117 CONG. REC. 33,648, 33,655 (1971) (“Recent experience has shown that the danger of 
harassment of jurors by unsuccessful litigants warrants a rule which imposes strict limitations on 
the instances in which jurors may be questioned about their verdict.”).  
 94.  117 CONG. REC. 33,642–48 (Letter from John L. McClellan, Senator, Ark., to Albert B. 
Maris, Judge, Comm. on Rules of Practice and Procedure (Aug. 12, 1971)).  
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In response, the Advisory Committee submitted a revised draft of the “long-
accepted Federal law”95 and prohibited jurors from testifying about any 
matter or statement that occurred during jury deliberations.96  The new 
version of the rule was sent to the Supreme Court, which subsequently 
adopted the rule and referred it to Congress for approval.97 
The Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives rejected this 
broader rule, finding that the Advisory Committee’s earlier draft was the 
better practice.98  The House noted the newly revised rule could not 
adequately address unjust jury verdicts nor other irregularities that occurred 
during deliberations.99  The House version subsequently omitted the language 
that prohibited testimony concerning any matter or statement occurring 
during the jury’s deliberations.100 
The Senate Judiciary Committee favored the narrower, more restrictive 
interpretation adopted by the Supreme Court.101  The Senate expressed 
concern that the “unwarranted and ill-advised” changes made by the House 
would expose verdicts to constant scrutiny based on occurrences during the 
jury’s deliberations.102  The Senate’s report reflected the policy concerns 
articulated in McDonald v. Pless,103 namely that “[p]ublic policy requires a 
finality to litigation” as well as promotion of free and frank discussion among 
jurors during deliberations.104  After a conference was convened, the 
committee adopted the more restrictive rule as passed by the Senate,105 which 
Congress enacted in 1974 as part of the Federal Rules of Evidence.106 
As adopted by Congress, Federal Rule of Evidence606(b) reads as 
follows: 
Rule 606.  Juror’s Competency as a Witness . . . . 
(b) During an Inquiry Into the Validity of a Verdict or Indictment. 
(1) Prohibited Testimony or Other Evidence.  During an inquiry 
into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify 
                                                          
 95.  S. REP. 93-1277, at 13 (1974).  
 96.  56 F.R.D. 183, 265 (1972).  
 97.  Id. at 184.  
 98.  H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 10 (1973).   
 99.  Id.  Specifically, the House was concerned about quotient verdicts and the “drunken 
condition of a fellow juror which so disabled him that he could not participate in the jury’s 
deliberations.”  Id.   
 100.  S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 13 (1974). 
 101.  Id. at 13–14.  
 102.  Id.  The Senate Report noted that allowing a losing party to challenge a jury verdict based 
on testimony of the deliberation process has “long been recognized as unwise by the Supreme 
Court.”  Id. at 13. 
 103.  See supra text accompanying notes 83–86.  
 104.  S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 14 (1974).  
 105.  H.R. REP. NO. 93-1597, at 8 (1974) (Conf. Rep.).  
 106.  Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 1, 88 Stat. 1926. 
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about any statement made or incident that occurred during the 
jury’s deliberations; the effect of anything on that juror’s or another 
juror’s vote; or any juror’s mental processes concerning the verdict 
or indictment.  The court may not receive a juror’s affidavit or 
evidence of a juror’s statement on these matters. 
(2) Exceptions.  A juror may testify about whether: 
(A) extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to 
the jury’s attention; 
(B) an outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any 
juror; or 
(C) a mistake was made in entering the verdict on the verdict 
form.107 
Almost every state, including Colorado, adopted its own version of the no-
impeachment rule following the federal codification.108 
C.  Interpreting Rule 606(b): From Tanner to Warger 
1.  Tanner Takes the Stage 
Following Rule 606(b)’s enactment, the Supreme Court first addressed 
the contours of the rule and its limitations on juror impeachment in Tanner 
v. United States.109  Prior to sentencing for mail fraud and conspiracy 
convictions, defendant Anthony Tanner moved for permission to interview 
jurors, an evidentiary hearing, and a new trial on the grounds of juror 
misconduct.110  In support of this motion, Tanner submitted affidavits of two 
jurors alleging that at least seven jurors were drinking substantial amounts of 
alcohol throughout the trial.111  The affidavits also alleged that during the trial 
four jurors had regularly smoked marijuana and two jurors ingested cocaine 
on several occasions.112  The United States District Court for the Middle 
District of Florida denied both the motion for an evidentiary hearing and new 
trial, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
affirmed.113  The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the 
District Court was required to hold an evidentiary hearing regarding the juror 
testimony.114  The Court considered two arguments advanced by Petitioner: 
                                                          
 107.  FED. R. EVID. 606(b). 
 108.  See Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 865 (2017) (noting that “[s]ome version 
of the no-impeachment rule is followed in every State”). 
 109.  483 U.S. 107 (1987).  
 110.  Id. at 112–13.  
 111.  Id. at 113–16.  
 112.  Id. at 115–16.  
 113.  Id. at 116.  
 114.  Id. 
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(1) juror testimony regarding drug and alcohol use during deliberations is not 
prohibited under Rule 606(b); and (2) the Sixth Amendment right to trial by 
a competent jury compels an evidentiary hearing on the juror testimony.115 
Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, held that drug and alcohol 
use during deliberations was not an outside or extraneous influence under 
Rule 606(b)(2), as argued by the petitioner.116  Although the Court 
acknowledged that the severe and improper effects of drugs and alcohol were 
troublesome, the Court concluded that any ambiguity about the plain 
language of Rule 606(b) was clarified by the legislative history of the rule.117  
The Court reasoned that the legislative history demonstrated that Congress 
did not intend to allow jurors to testify about juror conduct during 
deliberations, including juror intoxication.118  Rather than explicitly define 
what constituted an external or internal influence, the Court explained that a 
rigid distinction based on the juror’s physical location was not conducive to 
determining admissibility.119  Instead, the Court noted that the lower courts’ 
distinction based on the nature of the allegations was a more pragmatic 
approach to the testimony distinction.120 
The Tanner Court also rejected an argument that prohibiting testimony 
of juror misconduct violated the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee to a fair trial 
before an impartial jury.121  The Court reasoned that preexisting procedural 
safeguards within the justice system adequately protected a party’s Sixth 
Amendment right to an impartial jury, which invalidated any request for a 
post-verdict inquiry.122  First, the Court identified voir dire as a suitable 
means of detecting incompetent jurors.123  The Court also explained that court 
personnel, counsel, and the judge could observe the jury during trial and that 
jurors may report inappropriate juror behavior to the court before the jury 
renders a verdict.124  Lastly, a party may also request to impeach a verdict 
through the admission of nonjuror evidence.125  Although the Court 
acknowledged that some instances of jury misconduct could lead to the 
invalidation of a verdict regardless of the pre-existing procedural safeguards, 
the Court noted that it was unclear whether “the jury system could survive 
                                                          
 115.  Id. at 116–17.  
 116.  Id. at 126.  
 117.  Id. at 122.  
 118.  Id. at 125; see supra Part II.B (providing a brief summary of the legislative history of Rule 
606(b)). 
 119.  Tanner, 483 U.S. at 117–18.   
 120.  Id.  The Court did clarify that “allegations of physical or mental incompetence of a juror 
[are treated] as ‘internal’ rather than ‘external’ matters.”  Id. at 118.  
 121.  Id. at 127.  See supra note 4 for the relevant text of the Sixth Amendment.  
 122.  Tanner, 483 U.S. at 127.  
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Id. 
 125.  Id. 
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such efforts to perfect it.”126  Additionally, the Court noted that the allegations 
of juror misconduct in the present case were not so egregious as to fall under 
a common law exception allowing post-verdict inquiry.127  In light of these 
circumstances, the Court determined that an additional post-verdict exception 
was not necessary to protect the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right.128 
2.  Circuit and District Courts Apply Rule 606(b) to Juror Bias 
Federal courts have differed in approaches when determining the 
admissibility of post-verdict juror testimony alleging juror bias.129  Prior to 
Tanner, some courts have acknowledged that juror bias within deliberations 
may be so severe that it implicates the defendant’s constitutional right to an 
impartial jury.130  In Shillcutt v. Gagnon, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit noted that the no-impeachment rule cannot be applied 
so inflexibly as to deny due process, and that further review may be necessary 
to determine the impact of racial bias within deliberations.131  The court, 
however, ultimately declined to find that the no-impeachment rule’s 
prohibition on juror testimony offended “fundamental fairness.”132  Similarly 
in Smith v. Brewer,133 the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Iowa struggled to reconcile a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right 
to an impartial jury with Rule 606(b)’s prohibition on juror testimony 
alleging bias within deliberations.134  Although the court concluded that Rule 
606(b) rendered juror testimony inadmissible to impeach a verdict based on 
alleged bias, the court did state that Rule 606(b) should not be blindly applied 
where there was a substantial likelihood that a defendant was prejudiced by 
racial bias during deliberations.135 
In the wake of Tanner, the circuit courts split over whether the Tanner 
safeguards were procedurally sufficient to counter any Sixth Amendment 
challenges to Rule 606(b) in the context of racial bias during deliberations.136  
                                                          
 126.  Id. at 120.  
 127.  Id. at 125–26. 
 128.  Id. at 127. 
 129.  See infra Part II.C.2. 
 130.  See Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1159 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that “[t]he rule of 
juror incompetency cannot be applied in such an unfair manner as to deny due process”).  
 131.  Id. at 1159–60.  
 132.  Id. at 1160 (holding that defendant was barred under Rule 606(b) from introducing 
evidence of racial bias during jury deliberations).  
 133.  444 F. Supp. 482 (S.D. Iowa 1978), aff’d, 577 F.2d 466 (8th Cir. 1978). 
 134.  Id. at 490 (concluding that testimony on racist juror conduct during deliberations was 
inadmissible under Rule 606(b), but that evidence of racial bias “might very well offend 
fundamental fairness” in certain cases).  
 135.  Id.  
 136.  See United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1240 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding that Rule 
606(b) was not unconstitutional as applied to racial bias within the case).  But see United States v. 
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In United States v. Benally,137 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit considered whether excluding testimony of racial bias during 
deliberations violated the defendant’s constitutional right to an impartial 
jury.138  The court noted that important policy considerations animated Rule 
606(b)’s exclusion on testimony alleging juror bias within deliberations.139  
The Benally court also considered whether testimony regarding racial or 
ethnic juror comments made by a juror during deliberations fell under one of 
Rule 606(b)’s enumerated exceptions.140  Though it noted that the alleged 
racially biased statements were inappropriate, the court held that the juror 
testimony did not constitute either “extraneous prejudicial information” or an 
“outside influence.”141  Additionally, the court determined that the Tanner 
safeguards were appropriate procedural mechanisms to offset racial bias 
during jury deliberations which curtailed any constitutional concerns 
regarding the impartiality of the jury.142 
In United States v. Villar,143 the First Circuit agreed with the Benally 
court that the plain language of Rule 606(b) excluded juror testimony 
alleging instances of racial bias within deliberations.144  The Villar court, 
however, found the Tanner protections insufficient in the context of racial 
bias during deliberations.145  The Court reasoned that the Tanner protections 
                                                          
Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 87 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that Rule 606(b) does allow inquiry into allegations 
of racial bias within deliberations).  
 137.  Benally, 546 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 2008). 
 138.  Id. at 1239.  The defendant in Benally was a Native American man accused of assaulting a 
federal officer with a dangerous weapon.  Id.  A juror came forward after the trial and alleged that 
jurors made racially biased statements concerning a Native American propensity to consume alcohol 
and act violently.  Id. at 1239–40.   
 139.  Id. at 1236 (“Given the importance that Rule 606(b) places on protecting jury deliberations 
from judicial review, we cannot read it to justify . . . [what] Mr. Benally requests.”); see also 
Williams v. Price, 343 F.3d 223, 232–33 (3d Cir. 2003) (noting the importance of the public policy 
concern that “all verdicts could be, and many would be, followed by an inquiry in the hope of 
discovering something which might invalidate the finding” (quoting McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 
264, 267–68 (1915))). 
 140. Benally, 546 F.3d at 1236.  
 141.  Id. at 1237 (finding that a juror making racially discriminatory comments about the Native 
American defendant is best understood as internal reflections of a juror’s personal experience and 
not extraneous information) 
 142.  Id. at 1240 (“The safeguards that the Court relied upon for exposing the drug and alcohol 
use amongst jurors in Tanner are also available to expose racial biases . . . .”); see Robinson v. Polk, 
438 F.3d 350, 364 (4th Cir. 2006) (finding that Tanner factors provided an adequate safeguard of 
the defendant’s right to be sentenced by an impartial jury even though a juror read Bible passages 
during deliberations). 
 143.  586 F.3d 76 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 144.  Id. at 84 (noting that the plain language of Rule 606(b) precludes an investigation into a 
verdict based on juror testimony on racial bias during deliberations).  Contra United States v. 
Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1120 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that racial bias is exempt from Rule 606(b)’s 
restrictions on juror testimony). 
 145.  Villar, 586 F.3d at 87. 
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were particularly ineffective at detecting racial bias prior to deliberations, 
implicating constitutional concerns.146  Rather than rely on a rigid 
interpretation of Rule 606(b), the Villar court concluded that the Rule must 
not be applied so inflexibly as to bar juror testimony “in those rare and grave 
cases where claims of racial or ethnic bias during jury deliberations implicate 
a defendant’s right to . . . an impartial jury.”147 
In Kittle v. United States,148 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals     
upheld a trial judge’s denial of a motion for an evidentiary hearing in 
response to allegations of racial bias within jury deliberations.149  The court 
reasoned that evidence of racial bias within deliberations was inadmissible to 
impeach the verdict because the evidence was not an “extraneous influence” 
under the plain meaning of Rule 606(b).150  The court, however, determined 
that there was a countervailing interest in protecting the Sixth Amendment 
right to an impartial jury.151  The court rejected the Tanner procedural 
mechanisms as adequately protecting a defendant’s right to an impartial jury 
in the context of racial bias.152  To remedy disparity between the Rule’s 
restrictions and the substantial constitutional interests of the defendant, the 
court held that judges have the discretionary power in those “rare and 
exceptional circumstances where claims of racial or ethnic bias amongst 
jurors implicate the defendant’s right to an impartial jury.”153  Despite the 
court’s constitutional exception, it found that the trial judge acted within her 
discretion under the circumstances to refuse the defendant an evidentiary 
hearing on the allegations.154 
3.  Tanner Revisited: FRE 606(b) and Juror Bias in Warger v. 
Shauers 
In 2014, the Court again considered whether it should permit an 
exception to the no-impeachment rule in Warger v. Shauers.155  The 
                                                          
 146.  Id. at 88.  Cf. United States v. Heller, 785 F.2d 1524, 1527–28 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding 
that where jurors had been openly anti-Semitic during deliberations, a new trial was necessary to 
prevent prejudice from entering the justice system).  Although Heller was decided prior to Tanner, 
its holding reflects the view that in cases of extreme prejudice, procedural protections failed to 
protect the defendant from a biased jury.  Id. 
 147.  Villar, 586 F.3d at 87.  
 148.  65 A.3d 1144  (D.C. 2013). 
 149.  Id. at 1148.  The defendant, an African American, requested that the trial judge declare a 
mistrial, or alternatively, an investigation and evidentiary hearing about the impact of racially biased 
remarks towards African Americans made during deliberations.  Id. at 1147–48.  
 150.  Id. at 1151–52.  
 151.  Id. at 1152.  
 152.  Id. at 1154. 
 153.  Id. at 1155–56 (quoting United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 88 (1st Cir. 2009)). 
 154.  Id. at 1156.  
 155.  135 S. Ct. 521 (2014).  
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negligence case involved a car accident between a motorcycle and a truck, 
which severely injured the motorcycle driver, petitioner Gregory Warger.156  
During voir dire, a juror failed to disclose that she was partial towards the 
defendant because her daughter had been at fault in a car accident as well.157  
The Court unanimously determined that even if the plaintiff sought juror 
testimony to prove that the pro-defendant juror had lied during voir dire, the 
plaintiff was still seeking to circumvent the plain meaning of Rule 606(b) to 
question the validity of the verdict.158  The Court noted that Congress had 
expressly rejected a version of Rule 606(b) that would have most likely 
allowed the introduction of Warger’s evidence, but nonetheless chose a rule 
that reflected the more restrictive federal approach to protect the finality of 
verdicts.159 
The Warger Court reiterated that the Tanner safeguards sufficiently 
alleviated any constitutional concerns.160  The Court reasoned that even 
though voir dire failed to prevent a biased jury member, the remaining, 
available safeguards were adequate to protect the integrity of deliberations 
from biased jurors.161  Though the Court declined to create a constitutional 
exception to Rule 606(b), the Court did not foreclose the possibility of an 
exception for bias if confronted with a case involving “juror bias so extreme 
that, almost by definition, the jury trial right has been abridged.”162 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
The Court recognized the opportunity to address such a case in Pena-
Rodriguez v. Colorado.163  Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy held 
that where a juror makes a clear statement that indicated they relied on racial 
stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal defendant, the Constitution 
requires that the trial court be permitted to consider any evidence of the 
juror’s statement.164  The Court first discussed the pressing need to “purge 
racial prejudice from the administration of justice” and that such 
                                                          
 156.  Id. at 524.  
 157.  Id.  The juror stated during deliberations that “if her daughter had been sued, it would have 
ruined her life.”  Id.  After jury members informed Warger’s counsel, Warger moved for a new trial 
on the grounds that the juror member’s dishonesty violated his Sixth Amendment right to a fair and 
impartial jury.  Id.  
 158.  Id. at 528.  
 159.  Id. at 527.  
 160.  Id. at 529.  The Court also noted “any claim that Rule 606(b) is unconstitutional in 
circumstances such as these is foreclosed by our decision in Tanner.”  Id.  
 161.  Id.  
 162.  Id. at 529 n.3.  The Court also noted “[i]f and when such a case arises, the Court can 
consider whether the usual safeguards are or are not sufficient to protect the integrity of the process.” 
Id.  
 163.  137 S. Ct. 855 (2017).   
 164.  Id. at 869. 
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discrimination is inconsistent with the American commitment to “equal 
dignity of all persons.”165  Acknowledging that confronting racial animus in 
the justice system was not the sole responsibility of the legislature, the Court 
traced its historical interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment as 
prohibiting racial discrimination within the jury system.166  In order to 
eradicate state-sponsored racial discrimination, the Court has prohibited 
exclusion of prospective jurors on the basis of race,167 as well as held that the 
Constitution sometimes demands a right to ask questions about racial bias 
during voir dire.168  The Court concluded by noting that discrimination on the 
basis of race, “odious in all aspects, is especially pernicious in the 
administration of justice.”169 
The Court subsequently distinguished the present case from the drug 
and alcohol abuse in Tanner170 and the pro-defendant juror in Warger171 
because those circumstances were deviations from normal jury behavior.172  
While the Court acknowledged that those behaviors were troublesome and 
inappropriate, the Court noted that they were unique to a single jury or 
juror.173  Unlike juror incompetence, the Court found that racial bias 
“implicates unique historical, constitutional, and institutional concerns.”174  
The Court reasoned that racial bias is a unique challenge to the justice system 
in that it has systematically undermined constitutional guarantees of equal 
treatment under the law.175  The Court also noted that racial bias is 
functionally distinct because it is less perceptible to observation than other 
types of bias.176  The Court observed that voir dire can be insufficient by both 
failing to expose racial bias through generic questions or by exacerbating any 
existing racial bias through more focused questions.177  Additionally, the 
Court noted that the attending stigma of racial bias would make it difficult 
for one juror to accuse another of making racist statements during 
deliberations.178  As a result of these differences, the Court reasoned that the 
                                                          
 165.  Id. at 867.  
 166.  Id.  
 167.  Id. at 867 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)).  
 168.  Id. at 868 (citing Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524 (1973)).  
 169.  Id. (quoting Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979)).  
 170.  See supra text accompanying notes 111–112. 
 171.  See supra text accompanying note 157.  
 172.  Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 868.  
 173.  Id. (finding that “neither history nor common experience show that the jury system is rife 
with mischief of these or similar kinds”).  
 174.  Id.   
 175.  Id.  
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Id. at 869 (citing Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 195 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., 
concurring in result)).  
 178.  Id.  
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procedural safeguards relied upon in past cases to protect the Sixth 
Amendment are not sufficient to protect against racial bias.179  Although the 
Court noted that Tanner’s safeguards are potentially less effective in 
detecting racial bias than other kinds of bias, that issue alone was not 
“dispositive” in deciding the present case.180  Rather, the Court reasoned that 
a constitutional exception addressing racial bias was essential to preventing 
a “systemic loss of confidence” in jury verdicts rendered by a fair and 
impartial jury.181 
The Court also narrowed the circumstances in which post-verdict 
inquiries into jury deliberations are permitted.182  To inquire into racially 
motivated juror misconduct post-verdict, there must be a demonstration that 
one or more jurors made overtly racially biased statements that “cast serious 
doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the jury’s deliberations and resulting 
verdict.”183  The juror’s statements must show that racial bias was an 
important motivating factor in the juror’s vote to convict.184  The Court noted 
that whether this initial showing has been satisfied is a discretionary decision 
of the trial court that must be made considering the totality of the 
circumstances.185  State rules of professional ethics, as well as local court 
rules, would guide which evidence of racial bias during deliberations will be 
acquired and presented to the court.186  The Court emphasized that these state 
and local rules often limit post-trial contact with jurors to provide protection 
to the jurors after they render a verdict but also allow jurors to contact counsel 
as in the present case.187  Lastly, the Court noted that state adoptions of the 
Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) were no longer bars to post-verdict 
investigations of racism during deliberations.188 
Justice Thomas dissented, asserting that the right to an impartial jury did 
not ensure the defendant had an equal right to overturn a jury verdict using 
juror testimony about misconduct or bias during deliberations.189  Justice 
Thomas supported his assertion by tracing the common law development of 
the no-impeachment rule and detailing the states’ various approaches to the 
                                                          
 179.  Id. at 868–69 (noting that jurors are reluctant to report inappropriate statements during 
deliberations for fear of accusing another juror of bigotry and that generic questions about juror 
impartiality might not expose racism). 
 180.  Id. at 869.  
 181.  Id.  
 182.  Id. 
 183.  Id.  
 184.  Id.  
 185.  Id.  The Court noted that the trial court should consider the content and timing of the alleged 
racially biased statements as well as the reliability of the juror testimony.  Id.  
 186.  Id.  
 187.  Id. at 869–70.  
 188.  Id. at 870. 
 189.  Id. at 872 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
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admissibility of juror testimony on juror misconduct.190  Although there were 
state deviations, Justice Thomas noted that by the latter half of the nineteenth 
century, “Lord Mansfield’s no-impeachment rule had become firmly 
entrenched in American law.”191  Justice Thomas argued that the majority 
failed to ascribe this common law history as dispositive in its opinion.192  
Although Justice Thomas recognized that there are potentially valid reasons 
to depart from the no-impeachment rule, he asserted that the majority erred 
by circumventing the political process that codified Rule 606(b) and ignoring 
common law tradition.193 
In a separate dissent, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice 
Thomas, Justice Alito acknowledged that there are valid policy and injustice 
concerns animating the majority opinion, but that ultimately the Court 
reached the incorrect decision.194  Justice Alito’s primary concern was that 
the majority’s opinion would undermine the system of trial by jury that is 
functionally crucial to the legal system.195  Although the Court distinguished 
the present case from Tanner and Warger, Justice Alito found this argument 
unpersuasive.196  Justice Alito reasoned that the constitutionality of Rule 
606(b) was well-settled in both Tanner and Warger, and the Tanner 
safeguards were not less effective for protecting a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment interests “in cases involving racially biased jurors.”197 
Additionally, Justice Alito found no basis for the majority’s reasoning 
that the Constitution was less tolerant of racial bias than other forms of 
bias.198  In particular, Justice Alito found that the plain language of the Sixth 
Amendment did not support the notion that the extent of constitutional 
protection depended on the nature of the jury’s partiality or bias.199  Justice 
Alito acknowledged that the majority had pointed to prior holdings that 
endorsed constitutional protection against racial bias within the jury system 
but found this ultimately unpersuasive in supporting a preferential treatment 
of racial bias under the Constitution.200  Justice Alito also found that even 
though racial bias is especially troublesome, it was difficult to understand 
what role the “hierarchy of partiality or bias” has in a defendant’s right to be 
                                                          
 190.  Id. at 872–73.  
 191.  Id. at 873.  
 192.  Id. at 874. 
 193.  Id. 
 194.  Id. at 875 (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 195.  Id.  
 196.  Id. at 879.  
 197.  Id.  Justice Alito also noted that the effectiveness of these safeguards, especially in the case 
of voir dire, would be more appropriately assessed in the development of state and federal evidence 
rules.  Id. at 881.  
 198.  Id. at 882.  
 199.  Id.  
 200.  Id. at 883.  
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judged impartially.201  If the Sixth Amendment required admission of juror 
testimony about racial bias within deliberations, Justice Alito reasoned that 
juror testimony alleging any other type of bias should be given equal 
treatment.202 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, the Supreme Court held that the 
Constitution requires an exception to Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) when 
a juror made a clear statement of reliance on racial bias to convict a criminal 
defendant.203  The Court’s decision was correct because the holding furthered 
both the public policy goals of Rule 606(b) as well as the constitutional 
commitment to ensuring a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.204  The 
Court’s reasoning, however, was flawed because its holding should have 
been structured around the inadequacy of Tanner’s procedural protections to 
ensure a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury in cases of 
racial bias.205  The Court incorrectly focused on the unique historical and 
constitutional implications of racial bias in our criminal justice system as 
justification for the constitutional exception to Rule 606(b) and its state 
analogues.  As a result of its inexplicable departure from the Tanner 
framework, it elevated racial bias above all other types of bias that can be 
equally destructive to a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial 
jury.206 
A.  The Court’s Holding Is Correct Because It Is Consistent with Rule 
606(b) and Protects the Constitutional Right to a Fair and 
Impartial Jury 
The Court’s constitutional exception to permit juror testimony on racial 
bias is consistent with the policy considerations animating the no-
impeachment rule, as codified in Rule 606(b).207  The Court’s holding is also 
                                                          
 201.  Id. at 883.   
 202.  Id. at 883.  
 203.  Id. at 869 (majority opinion).  
 204.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 205.  See infra Part IV.C.  The Court listed four procedural protections for a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to an impartial jury in Tanner v. United States: (1) voir dire; (2) court and counsel 
observations of jurors; (3) non-juror evidence of misconduct; and (4) juror reports of misconduct 
before a verdict is rendered.  483 U.S. 107, 127 (1987).  See supra Part II.C.1 for a discussion of 
Tanner v. United States.  
 206.  See infra Part IV.C.  
 207.  See FED. R. EVID. 606(b) advisory committee’s note to 1972 proposed rules (“The values 
sought to be promoted by excluding the evidence include freedom of deliberation, stability and 
finality of verdicts, and protection of jurors against annoyance and embarrassment.” (citing 
McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264 (1915))). 
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consistent with prior Supreme Court case law, which allows the possibility 
of a constitutional exception to the no-impeachment rule when juror 
misconduct egregiously threatens the defendant’s right to an impartial jury.208  
First enumerated in McDonald v. Pless, and reflected in the legislative history 
of Rule 606(b), there are substantial policy considerations that support the 
rule against admission of jury testimony to impeach the verdict: preserving 
the finality of verdicts, preventing juror harassment by losing parties, and 
promoting free and frank jury discussion during deliberations.209  Rather than 
defy legislative intent, the Court’s exception to Rule 606(b) strikes the proper 
balance between preserving these policy objectives and upholding a 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights in the face of juror misconduct.210  
Additionally, the Court’s holding is consistent with the broader goal of 
bolstering public confidence in the ability of the justice system to fulfill Sixth 
Amendment guarantees. 
1.  Preserving the Finality of Verdicts and Promoting Free and 
Frank Jury Discussion 
Experiences from the nineteen federal and state jurisdictions that have 
allowed juror testimony in instances of bias during deliberations strongly 
suggest that the Court’s exception will not undermine the finality of verdicts 
nor substantially increase the amount of post-trial litigation.211  Jurisdictions 
that have permitted exceptions to the no-impeachment rule in instances of 
racial bias continue to function without experiencing a “barrage of 
postverdict scrutiny of juror conduct.”212  Among the nineteen state and 
federal jurisdictions that have allowed racial bias exceptions, only fourteen 
                                                          
 208.  See Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521, 529 n.3 (2014) (noting that in some instances of 
juror bias, the Court may determine whether the Tanner safeguards are constitutionally sufficient); 
McDonald, 238 U.S. at 268 (noting that there may be cases of egregious juror conduct that deserve 
an exception to the no-impeachment rule); United States v. Reid, 12 How. 361, 366 (1915) (noting 
that certain cases may arise where it would be unjust to refuse testimony on juror misconduct).  
 209.  McDonald, 238 U.S. at 267–268; see S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 14 (1974) (“Public policy 
requires a finality to litigation.”).  See supra Part II.B for the legislative history of the Rule. 
 210.  Amanda R. Wolin, What Happens in the Jury Room Stays in the Jury Room . . . but Should 
It?: A Conflict Between the Sixth Amendment and Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b), 60 U.C.L.A. L. 
REV. 262, 293–94 (2012).  
 211.  See Amicus Curiae Brief of Ctr. of the Admin. of Crim. Law in Support of Petitioner at 
21–22, Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017) (No. 15-606) [hereinafter Amicus Brief 
of Ctr. of Admin. Crim. Law] (finding that racial bias exceptions have minimally increased inquiry 
into verdicts); see also id. at app. A (identifying the nineteen jurisdictions which have allowed 
exceptions for the no-impeachment rule as well as the outcomes of thirty cases in these 
jurisdictions).  
 212.  Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 121 (1987); see Brief of Amici Curiae Retired 
Judges in Support of Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 3, Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 
855 (2017) (No. 15-606) (asserting that policy concerns have not been reflected in the concrete 
experience of Massachusetts or other states with no-impeachment exceptions).  
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out of thirty cases in which these courts considered allegations of racial bias 
have resulted in new trials or further inquiries.213  Additionally, no 
jurisdiction has seen more than five cases that involve inquiry into post-
verdict racial bias, even among those jurisdictions that have adopted the 
exception.214  These jurisdictions show that the Court’s narrow exception to 
the no-impeachment rule will not open the floodgates for losing litigants who 
wish to impeach their verdicts, but simply allow testimony in those limited 
circumstances where racial bias was a motivating factor in conviction.215 
The Court’s exception to Rule 606(b) only renders testimony about 
racial bias admissible if that testimony can be definitely proven.216  Under the 
Court’s holding, a post-verdict inquiry into juror testimony may proceed only 
upon a showing that “one or more jurors made statements exhibiting overt 
racial bias that cast serious doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the jury’s 
deliberations and resulting verdict.”217  Although the Court did not give 
specific guidance to the trial courts regarding what merits a threshold 
showing of racial animus as a significant motivating factor in the juror’s vote 
to convict,218 trial courts can implement the Court’s constitutional exception 
in the same manner as courts that have received testimony under one of Rule 
606(b)’s enumerated exceptions without inquiring into the mental processes 
of the jurors.219  Racist behavior is often easier to corroborate or refute than 
extraneous or outside influence because the racist misconduct occurs in the 
presence of all other jurors during deliberations.220  As a result, Courts may 
implement a hearing process to merely confirm the veracity of allegations, 
thereby preserving the sanctity of jury deliberations and preventing any 
increased disruption to verdicts in compliance with legislative intent.221 
                                                          
 213.  Amicus Brief of Ctr. of Admin. Crim. Law, supra note 211, at 22.  
 214.  Kevin Zhao, Note, The Choice Between Right and Easy: Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado and 
the Necessity of a Racial Bias Exception to Rule 606(b), 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 33, 
45 n.119 (2016).  
 215.  Amicus Brief of Ctr. on Admin. Crim. Law, supra note 211, at 21; see United States v. 
Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 87–88 (1st Cir. 2009) (emphasizing that “not every stray or isolated off-base 
statement made during deliberations requires a hearing”). 
 216.  See Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869 (holding that testimony is admissible only if there 
is a showing of overtly racist comments during deliberations).   
 217.  Id.  
 218.  Id.  
 219.  See Wolin, supra note 210, at 296 (explaining that a juror can testify about the objective 
presence of biased conduct or comments without revealing the effect or internal mental processes 
as related to the verdict reached).  
 220.  Developments in the Law—Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1472, 1599 
(1988). 
 221.  S. REP. NO. 93-1277, at 14 (1974) (“Public policy requires a finality to litigation.  And 
common fairness requires that absolute privacy be preserved for jurors to engage in the full and free 
debate necessary to the attainment of just verdicts.”); see Wolin, supra note 210, at 296 (“[T]he 
policies would not be risked by permitting juror testimony concerning juror bias or prejudice to 
prove its presence and not its effect on the jury.”).  
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Congress passed a version of Rule 606(b) which does permit jurors to 
testify on what occurred during deliberations on matters involving 
“extraneous prejudicial information” and “outside influence[s].”222  Courts 
have allowed juror testimony about occurrences within deliberations under 
Rule 606(b)(2)(A) for accounts of a juror’s unsanctioned outside research on 
evidence in a case223 as well as relating personal knowledge of the defendant 
to the jury.224  The trial judge has broad discretion to create a sufficient 
process to determine whether the misconduct occurred and whether it was 
actually prejudicial.225  When a litigant asserts that there was juror 
misconduct that improperly influenced the jury during deliberations, the trial 
judge can chose whether and how to receive affidavits alleging the 
misconduct and determine whether a hearing is necessary to evaluate such 
claims.226  Inquiry at the hearing is limited to establishing the objective 
verification of the alleged occurrence but may not extend into the realm of 
the occurrence’s effects on the jury.227  The trial judge must then attempt to 
“reach a subjective conclusion based on objective facts” for whether a new 
trial is merited under all the circumstances.228  Using these same techniques, 
trial courts are already equipped to investigate objectively verifiable 
instances of juror bias under the Court’s constitutional exception without 
undermining the finality of verdicts or the privacy of jury deliberations.229 
                                                          
 222.  FED. R. EVID. 606(b); see Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 523 F.2d 140, 148–49 (3d Cir. 1975) 
(noting that Rule’s exceptions for extraneous information incorporated the courts’ early awareness 
that any rule that flatly prohibited receiving juror testimony concerning deliberations “contravened 
another public policy: that of ‘redressing the injury of the private litigant’ where a verdict was 
reached by a jury not impartial”(quoting McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 267 (1915))).  
 223.  Kiser v. Bryant Elec., 695 F.2d 207, 214–15 (6th Cir. 1982) (admitting testimony for 
purposes of new trial that a juror conducted an experiment regarding aluminum wires at issue in the 
case and reported his findings back to the jury during deliberations). 
 224.  United States v. Howard, 506 F.2d 865, 866 (5th Cir. 1975) (finding that an affidavit 
alleging a juror had told members of the jury during deliberations that the defendant had been “in 
trouble” several times required further inquiry to determine whether or not prejudice had influenced 
the verdict).  
 225.  United States v. Ortiz-Arrigoitia, 996 F.2d 436, 443 (1st Cir. 1993) (“The trial judge is not, 
however, shackled to a rigid and unyielding set [of] rules and procedures that compel any particular 
form or scope of inquiry.”).  
 226.  United States v. Davis, 60 F.3d 1479, 1483–84 (10th Cir. 1995).  In Davis, the court found 
that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying an evidentiary hearing on extraneous 
information introduced to the jurors but detailed the procedures for admitting such testimony for 
purposes of obtaining a new trial.  Id.  
 227.  Susan Crump, Jury Misconduct, Jury Interviews, and the Federal Rules of Evidence: Is the 
Broad Exclusionary Principle of Rule 606(b) Justified?, 66 N.C. L. REV. 509, 532 (1988) (“Courts 
have correctly reasoned that because losing litigants are prohibited from presenting evidence of the 
mental or emotional processes of jurors, the trial judge should likewise be barred from making such 
inquiries and may only determine prejudice by drawing reasonable inferences.”).  
 228.  Id.  
 229.  Amicus Brief of Ctr. of Admin. Crim. Law, supra note 211, at 17.  
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Similarly, jurisdictions that have allowed post-verdict testimony on 
racial bias during deliberations have taken narrow approaches to identifying 
and inquiring into juror testimony.230  These jurisdictions also demonstrate 
that the court is capable of “discern[ing] the dividing line between 
[statements] that are ‘clear[ly]’ based on racial or ethnic bias and those that 
are . . . ambiguous.”231  Courts can distinguish between comments that merit 
a new trial and those that do not by utilizing harmless-error review, which 
“determin[es] whether comments made a difference in the outcome of the 
trial.”232  Courts that have applied this exception prior to Pena-Rodriguez 
decision have clarified that impeaching a verdict through juror testimony of 
racial bias will not be granted liberally.233  Collectively, these different 
approaches provide a structured inquiry into juror testimony without 
compromising the privacy of jury deliberations or disrupting the finality of 
verdicts.234  As a result, the Court’s exception is still consistent with finality 
of verdicts and protection of free and frank discussion, while addressing valid 
concerns about racial prejudice as an impediment to the Sixth Amendment.235 
2.  Juror Harassment 
The Court’s broader application of Rule 606(b) will also not increase 
post-trial juror harassment by those seeking to invalidate verdicts through 
                                                          
 230.  Brief for Amici Curiae Professors of Law in Support of Petitioner at 15–16, Pena-
Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855 (2017) (No. 15-606).  
 231.  Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. 885, 884 (2017) (Alito, J., dissenting) (third alteration in 
original) (observing that courts may be unable to distinguish between prejudicial statements and 
those that are merely ambiguous).  
 232.  Amicus Brief of Ctr. of Admin. Crim. Law, supra note 211, at 25–26; see United States v. 
Shalhout, 507 F. App’x 201, 206–07 (3d Cir. 2012) (finding that racially biased remarks by juror 
were stray isolated comments that did not implicate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights nor 
warrant a constitutional exception under Rule 606(b)); Shillcutt v. Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1159 
(7th Cir. 1987) (determining that there was not a “substantial probability that the alleged racial slur 
made a difference in the outcome of the trial”); State v. Hunter, 463 S.E.2d 314, 316 (S.C. 1995) 
(holding that the court was “unconvinced what occurred in the jury room demonstrated racial 
prejudice toward [the defendant], or that [the juror] felt threatened or coerced into voting guilty”).  
 233.  See State v. Santiago, 715 A.2d 1, 20 n.21 (Conn. 1998) (citing State v. Newsome, 682 
A.2d 972, 992 (1996)) (recognizing that a new trial is only merited in instances where juror 
misconduct has prejudiced the defendant to the extent that he has not received a fair trial).  
 234.  See supra notes 211–215 and accompanying text (detailing the minimal increase in post-
verdict litigation in jurisdictions that allow exceptions to the no-impeachment rule).  
 235.  See Jessica L. West, 12 Racist Men: Post-Verdict Evidence of Juror Bias, 27 HARV. J. ON 
RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 165, 203 (2011) (“Adoption of the . . . exception would preserve the 
finality of the vast majority of verdicts as well as . . . address[ing] valid concerns about . . . the 
injection of bias and misrepresentation into juror deliberations.”).  
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juror testimony.236  In addition to the ABA rules,237 state and federal rules 
regarding ethics and post-trial jury contact continue to police the interactions 
between counsel and jurors post-trial.238  Many local rules prohibit parties 
and counsel from contacting a juror absent a court order while other rules 
prohibit parties and their counsel from contacting jurors in a manner that 
amounts to harassment.239  The Court’s exception is also unlikely to increase 
harassment because the existing exceptions to Rule 606(b) have already 
given defeated parties an avenue to harass juries.240  Racially biased 
comments during deliberations are easily verifiable through juror 
corroboration without inquiring into the effect or the mental processes of the 
jurors.241  As a result, parties will not receive a relaxed standard of inquiry 
and are not more likely to seek to impeach the verdict through the Court’s 
constitutional exception than those under the existing exceptions to Rule 
606(b). 
In courts that have allowed exceptions for racial bias, jurors had 
proactively contacted defense counsel of their own volition and volunteered 
to provide affidavits or testimony on juror misconduct.242  In some 
jurisdictions, if a party fails to follow the sanctioned procedures for obtaining 
evidence of jury misconduct, the court has expressed that it will not consider 
                                                          
 236.  Developments in the Law—Race and the Criminal Process, supra note 220, at 1599.  
Contra Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 885 (Alito, J., dissenting) (finding that the exception will 
prompt losing parties to contact and question jurors post-verdict).  
 237.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r.3.5 (2002) (providing general rules for contact with 
jurors); Developments in the Law—Race and the Criminal Process, supra note 220, at 1599 (noting 
that the ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a lawyer from harassing jurors). 
 238.  Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869 (majority opinion) (commenting that many jurisdictions 
have rules that prohibit or restrict post-verdict contact with jurors).  
 239.  See Crump, supra note 227, at 526–28 (providing overview of federal local rules and 
restrictions on contacting jurors); see, e.g., JOINT KY. CIV. PRAC. R. 47.1(a) (“Unless permitted by 
the Court, no person, party or attorney, nor representative of a party or attorney, may contact, 
interview, or communicate with any juror before, during, or after trial.”); E.D.N.C. CIV. R. 47.1(c) 
(“Following the discharge of a jury from further consideration of a case, no attorney or party litigant 
shall . . . ask questions of or make comments to a member of that jury . . . that are calculated merely 
to harass or embarrass such a juror . . . .”); S.D. TEX. CRIM. R. 24.1 (“Except with leave of Court, 
no attorney, party, nor agent of either of them may communicate with a former juror to obtain 
evidence of misconduct in the jury’s deliberations.”).  
 240.  Developments in the Law—Race and the Criminal Process, supra note 220, at 1599. 
 241.  Supra note 220 and accompanying text.  
 242.  Ashok Chandran, Note, Color in the “Black Box”: Addressing Racism in Juror 
Deliberations, 5 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 28, 50 (2014) (“In every case that has addressed the issue so 
far, petitioners have only raised their claims once a member of the jury actively reached out and 
alerted them of racist comments or behaviors that took place.”); see, e.g., Warger v. Shauers, 135 
S. Ct. 521, 524 (2014) (noting that the juror contacted defense counsel post-verdict to express 
concern over another juror’s pro-defendant comments during deliberations); United States v. Villar, 
586 F.3d 76, 81 (1st Cir. 2009) (noting that a juror e-mailed the convicted defendant’s counsel post-
verdict to inform counsel of anti-Hispanic commentary during deliberations). 
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a claim of jury misconduct based on the improper methods of obtaining 
testimony.243 
3.  Public Confidence in the Jury System 
There are sound public policy goals that legitimize current jurisprudence 
prohibiting juror testimony as a means to impeach the verdict, as codified in 
Rule 606(b).244  Allowing verdicts to go unquestioned without further 
investigation after parties have made legitimate allegations of racial bias, 
however, violates even minimum Sixth Amendment requirements.245  Recent 
studies have identified procedural justice, that is, perceived fairness of the 
manner in which the government exercises authority, as one of the “most 
important factors in shaping individuals’ views on a legal system’s 
legitimacy.”246  When courts have denied defendants the ability to inquire 
into allegations of racial bias during jury deliberations, it undermines the 
justice system’s perceived legitimacy by potentially denying the defendant a 
fair jury trial.247  The no-impeachment rule as applied in cases of racial bias 
is perceived as the court’s refusal to protect defendants of color against racial 
bias in jury deliberations, leading to continued distrust and lack of confidence 
in the criminal justice system.248  As applied prior to the Court’s holding in 
Pena-Rodriguez, Rule 606(b) “actually had the converse effect [of] 
delegitimizing courts in minority communities.”249 
Conversely, the Court’s constitutional exception to examine potential 
racial bias in jury deliberations is a step toward remedying public confidence 
that the justice system can assure a fair and impartial trial by jury for 
                                                          
 243.  See Impeachment of Verdicts by Jurors—Rule of Evidence 606(b), 4 WM. MITCHELL L. 
REV. 417, 437–38 (1978) (detailing Minnesota state court approach to receiving post-verdict juror 
testimony in which a party must “wait until they are approached by a juror or other person with 
knowledge of possible jury misconduct” or petition the Court for a Schwartz hearing in which jurors 
can be summoned and questioned).  
 244.  See supra note 209 and accompanying text.  
 245.  Leah S.P. Rabin, Comment, The Public Injury of an Imperfect Trial: Fulfilling the 
Promises of Tanner and the Sixth Amendment Through Post-Verdict Inquiry into Truthfulness at 
Voir Dire, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 537, 555 (2011) (“[A]llowing verdicts to stand without inquiry 
after legitimate allegations of juror racism have been presented is an affront to the very foundation 
of our judicial system.”).  
 246.  Chandran, supra note 242, at 48 (citing Tom R. Tyler & Jonathan Jackson, Future 
Challenges in the Study of Legitimacy and Criminal Justice, in LEGITIMACY AND CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: AN INTERNATIONAL EXPLORATION 83, 83 (Justice Tankebe & Allison Liebling eds., 
2013)).  
 247.  Chandran, supra note 242, at 50; see Developments in the Law—Race and the Criminal 
Process, supra note 220, at 1600 (noting that refusing to admit evidence of overt racism within jury 
deliberations to overturn verdicts has a “demoralizing effect on public confidence.”).  
 248.  Chandran, supra note 242, at 50 (noting that “[d]ecisions like Bennally can be seen as 
further microaggressions; they send clear messages that the institution of ‘law’ does not care about 
the concerns” of minorities).  
 249.  Chandran, supra note 242, at 50.  
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defendants of all races.250  The Supreme Court is already applying its Pena-
Rodriguez constitutional exception by allowing defendants to expose 
instances of racial bias within jury deliberations.251  On September 26, 2017, 
the Court issued a stay of execution for an African American death row 
inmate Keith Tharpe while it considered Tharpe’s appeal.252  Tharpe’s 
attorneys, relying on the holding in Pena-Rodriguez, assert that juror Barney 
Gattie’s racial bias towards African Americans was a violation of Tharpe’s 
right to an impartial jury under the Sixth Amendment.253  Although Gattie 
represented during jury selection that he could be fair and impartial during 
the trial, Gattie signed an affidavit seven years after the trial in which he used 
the n-word with reference to Tharpe and other African Americans, and 
questioned whether “black people even have souls.”254  On January 8, 2018, 
the Court  issued an unsigned opinion remanding the case to the lower courts 
to determine whether Tharpe should be permitted to appeal the district court’s 
denial of his motion to reopen his case.255  The Court noted that there was a 
“strong factual basis” that racial bias affected Gattie’s decision to vote for the 
death penalty in Tharpe’s case.256  Prior to Pena-Rodriguez, Tharpe’s 
attorneys were unable to present evidence of Gattie’s racial bias under 
Georgia’s no-impeachment rule.257  The Court’s exception offers protections 
to defendants who were unable to present evidence of Sixth Amendment 
violations before Pena-Rodriguez, as well as continued protections for a 
defendant’s fundamental constitutional rights against future racial bias within 
                                                          
 250.  See Kittle v. United States, 65 A.3d 1144, 1155 (D.C. 2013) (citing State v. Santiago, 715 
A.2d 1, 19–20 (Conn. 1998)) (“[I]f we required trial courts to ignore all allegations that jurors 
expressed racial or ethnic bias during deliberations, we would jeopardize the public’s confidence in 
the fair administration of justice.”); Developments in the Law—Race and the Criminal Process, 
supra note 103, at 1600 (“Permitting defendants to expose racially tainted deliberations gives the 
public—particularly minority citizens—more reason, not less, to trust the final results of the 
criminal justice system.”).  
 251.  Dakin Andone & Emanuella Grinberg, SCOTUS Stays Execution of Georgia Death Row 
Inmate amid Claims of Racial Bias, CNN (Sept. 27, 2017, 12:57 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2017/09/26/us/keith-tharpe-georgia-execution/index.html.  
 252.  Id.  Although Chief Justice Roberts previously joined Justice Alito’s dissent in Pena-
Rodriguez, the Chief Justice did not join Justices Thomas, Alito, or Gorsuch in their dissent of the 
stay of execution.  Id.  
 253.  Id.  Tharpe’s attorneys also assert that Tharpe’s low IQ makes him ineligible for the death 
penalty under federal law.  Id. 
 254.  Id. 
 255.  Tharpe v. Sellers, No. 17–6075, slip op. at 2–3 (U.S. Jan. 8, 2018) (per curiam).  
 256.  Id. at 2.  
 257.  Id.  
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jury deliberations.258  The Court correctly recognized that a rigid application 
of Rule 606(b) is contrary to the goals the Rule purports to achieve.259 
B.  The Court Failed to Base Its Holding on the Inadequacy of Tanner 
Sixth Amendment Protections 
The Court’s reasoning ultimately fails to persuasively support its 
holding in Pena-Rodriguez because it ignores the insufficiency of Tanner 
safeguards to protect a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights as controlling in 
Rule 606(b) jurisprudence.260  In both Tanner and Warger, the Court stated 
that refusing post-verdict juror testimony about juror misconduct was not a 
Sixth Amendment violation because there were safety valves in place to 
ensure an impartial jury.261  If the Court had based its holding on the 
insufficiency of Tanner safeguards to protect a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment rights, it would have “fit neatly into [the] Court’s broader 
jurisprudence concerning the constitutionality of evidence rules.”262  The 
Court incorrectly reasoned that because of the unique historical and 
constitutional implications of racial bias in the jury system, racial bias should 
necessarily be placed within the highest tier of the “hierarchy of partiality or 
bias” that the Court has inadvertently constructed.263 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in both Tanner and Warger affirmed 
that a defendant’s right to an unimpaired jury was sufficiently protected by 
four aspects of trial: voir dire, court and counsel observation during trial, 
potential use of nonjuror evidence of misconduct, and the ability of jurors to 
report misconduct before a verdict is rendered.264  After Tanner, courts 
refused to acknowledge constitutional challenges to Rule 606(b) on the 
grounds that the Tanner protections adequately assured an individual a fair 
and impartial jury.265  Despite the subsequent reliance on the Tanner 
framework as applied to Rule 606(b), the Court incorrectly chose to decide 
the case solely on societal concerns rather than address the inadequacy of the 
                                                          
 258.  See Pena-Rodriguez v. People, 350 P.3d 287, 294 (Colo. 2015), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 855 
(2017) (noting that a defendant’s constitutional right to an impartial jury is of paramount 
importance); United States v. Heller, 785 F.2d 1524, 1527 (11th Cir. 1986) (finding that prejudice 
in a judicial context prevents the impartial decision-making that the Sixth Amendment requires). 
 259.  See supra text accompanying notes 93–94.   
 260.  See supra text accompanying notes 90–92.   
 261.  Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521, 529 (2014); Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 127 
(1987).  
 262.  Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 879 (2017) (Alito, J., dissenting).  
 263.  Id. at 883; see also supra notes 147–48 and accompanying text (noting that there is no 
constitutional or legislative basis for the Court’s reasoning to elevate racism above other forms of 
bias).   
 264.  Warger, 135 S. Ct. at 529 (asserting that the enumerated protections in Tanner were a 
similarly adequate means of assuring juror impartiality).  
 265.  See supra note 209.  
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Tanner protections.266  The Court’s holding solely recognizes racial bias as 
deserving a constitutional exception to the no-impeachment rule on the 
grounds that racism has been and continues to be a systematic and recurring 
evil throughout the history of our criminal justice system.267  As a result, the 
holding suggests that the Sixth Amendment prioritizes racially or ethnically 
biased juror misconduct above all other types of bias that could equally taint 
jury deliberations.268  Additionally, the Court’s reliance on the unique role of 
racial bias as determinative gives rise to the dissent’s main point of 
contention: If the Sixth Amendment requires admission of juror testimony 
about juror bias, all statements or conduct showing bias should be given equal 
weight.269 
The Supreme Court should have grounded its opinion instead on the 
insufficiency of the Tanner Court protections in the context of racially or 
ethnically biased comments made during deliberations.270  If the Court had 
based its holding on the inadequacy of Tanner protections in the context of 
racial bias, it would not have construed the Sixth Amendment as giving 
preference to a single type of bias.  A holding based on the ultimate failure 
of the Tanner safeguards to protect a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to 
an impartial jury would not give constitutional preference to racial bias, but 
would grant an exception based on the Court’s accepted framework of 
analyzing the constitutionality of Rule 606(b) as applied in Tanner.  Though 
the Court did discuss the Tanner safeguards as inadequate to protect against 
racial bias, the Court’s discussion was incidental to the case rather than 
determinative of the outcome.271 
First, the Court should have more thoroughly addressed voir dire as a 
faulty mechanism for detecting overt racism in potential jury members.272  
Voir dire is often performed by the judge rather than defense counsel in both 
                                                          
 266.  See Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 882 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“In short, the Court provides 
no good reason to depart from the calculus made in Tanner and Warger.”).  
 267.  Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 868 (majority opinion) (“[R]acial bias, a familiar and 
recurring evil that, if left unaddressed, would risk systemic injury to the administration of justice.”).  
 268.  See id. at 882–883 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting that the majority’s reasoning is 
unsupported by the Sixth Amendment, which does not recognize a hierarchy of partiality or bias).  
 269.  See id. at 883 (finding that the Court’s preferential treatment to racial bias subjects other 
types of juror partiality to a lesser constitutional ranking).  
 270.  See supra note 63 and accompanying text.  But see Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 
127 (1987) (finding that Sixth Amendment interests are protected by voir dire, jury observations by 
court and counsel, and admissibility of nonjuror evidence of misconduct). 
 271.  See Pena-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 869 (majority opinion) (“The recognition that certain 
types of Tanner safeguards may be less effective in rooting out racial bias than other kinds of bias 
is not dispositive.”).  
 272.  See United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 87 (1st Cir. 2009) (“While . . . voir dire of the 
jurors can help to disclose prejudice, it has shortcomings because some jurors may be reluctant to 
admit racial bias.”).  
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state and federal courts.273  Though unintentional, judges may inadvertently 
subject potential jurors to social pressure to conform to the notion of a fair 
and impartial juror because the judge is perceived as an authority figure even 
if the potential juror may be neither “fair” nor “impartial.”274  Once the jurors 
retire to the deliberation room, they might be more likely to reveal biases in 
the natural course of deliberations rather than when asked if they are “fair 
and impartial” in open court.275  Additionally, racist attitudes are often not 
overtly expressed but are a result of implicit bias that a juror may not be 
cognizant of during voir dire.276  As a result, direct questions on voir dire 
inquiring specifically into racial bias are unlikely to identify racist jurors 
through the voir dire process or observation of court and counsel.277  
However, research suggests that implicit bias may be combatted by “making 
race salient or calling attention to the possibility of racial bias” to “encourage 
prospective jurors to reflect on their own possible biases and consciously 
counter what would otherwise be automatic stereotype-congruent 
responses.”278 
Even if courts were able to more accurately identify racist jurors through 
focused questioning during voir dire,279 defendants are not guaranteed the 
ability to utilize these specific voir dire techniques.280  Although a defendant 
has a constitutional right to conduct voir dire into racial bias in all capital 
cases where the defendant is charged with a violent interracial crime,281  the 
defendant does not have that same right in all other instances.  In Ristaino v. 
Ross,282 the Court held that voir dire directed at racial prejudice was not 
constitutionally required absent special circumstances of the case that suggest 
a significant likelihood of prejudice by the jurors.283  The Court clarified that 
                                                          
 273.  Cynthia Lee, A New Approach to Voir Dire on Racial Bias, 5 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 843, 
848 (2015).  
 274.  Wolin, supra note 210, at 287 (noting that “if the judge asks potential jurors to be fair and 
impartial, it is likely that many jurors will declare they are both” because potential jurors perceive 
the judge as an authority figure).  
 275.  Id. at 287–88.  
 276.  Lee, supra note 273, at 860 (“[S]ocial scientists have convincingly demonstrated that bias 
is largely unconscious and often at odds with conscious beliefs.”); see West, supra note 235, at 201 
(“Because jurors may have difficulty recognizing or admitting their biases, the potential for 
misrepresentations of bias may be even greater than it is for other types of juror representations.”). 
 277.  Lee, supra note 273, at 846.  But see id. at 846–47 (asserting that a series of open-ended 
questions during voir dire might mitigate effects of implicit bias).  
 278.  Id. at 867.  
 279.  See id. at 866–69 (finding that courts can combat implicit bias during voir dire by raising 
awareness of implicit bias through open ended questions and avoiding negative stereotyping).  
 280.  See Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36–37 (1986) (holding that a capital defendant charged 
with an interracial crime is entitled to have potential jurors asked about racial bias during voir dire). 
 281.  Id. 
 282.  424 U.S. 589 (1976). 
 283.  Id. at 597. 
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the mere fact that the defendant was a person of color and the victim of the 
alleged crimes was white was not sufficient to constitute a significant 
likelihood of biased jurors.284  Though the Ristaino Court noted that it was a 
wiser course of action to conduct specific questioning on racial bias if 
requested by the defendant,285 the Court in Rosales-Lopez v. United States286 
upheld a federal court’s decision to deny a defendant’s request for race-
specific questioning toward people of Mexican descent in an illegal 
immigration case.287  As a result, the Court has unequivocally stated that there 
is no constitutional requirement for voir dire on racial prejudice absent 
special circumstances or a capital offense.288 
Additionally, juror testimony in most cases is the only form of evidence 
that an individual can submit after trial to confirm that jurors made biased 
statements during deliberations.289  In order to insulate the jury from public 
or judicial scrutiny and promote free and frank jury discussions, no outside 
observers may monitor the deliberations for prejudice.290  Subsequently, the 
only way to obtain objective evidence of bias during deliberations is through 
a juror’s own testimony rather than observations of court or counsel.291  As a 
result, visual observations of the jury by the court and counsel are unlikely to 
detect jurors harboring racial bias either.292  While court observations or non-
juror evidence of misconduct might be adequate to detect juror incompetence, 
such as drug and alcohol use, they are minimally effective in detecting racial 
bias in the jury.293 
The last Tanner safeguard—jurors reporting misconduct before the 
verdict is reached—is also unlikely to protect a defendant from racial bias 
during deliberations.294  Unless specifically instructed by the court, jurors 
may not realize that they have the ability to report juror misconduct or that 
                                                          
 284.  Id.  
 285.  Id. at 597 n. 9.  
 286.  451 U.S. 182 (1981). 
 287.  Id. at 193–94. 
 288.  See id. at 194 (finding that it was not a reversible error to refuse the defendant criminal 
racial questioning during voir dire because there were no allegations of racial or ethnic bias during 
trial and no violent crimes committed).   
 289.  Developments in the Law—Race and the Criminal Process, supra note 220, at 1596.  
 290.  See United States v. Benally, 546 F.3d 1230, 1233–34 (10th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he inner 
workings and deliberation of the jury are deliberately insulated . . . .”).  
 291.  Developments in the Law—Race and the Criminal Process, supra note 220, at 1599 (noting 
that juror testimony about biased misconduct is easily verified).  
 292.  United States v. Villar, 586 F.3d 76, 87 (1st Cir. 2009). 
 293.  See id. (“[N]on-jurors are more likely to report inappropriate conduct—such as alcohol or 
drug use—among jurors than racial statements uttered during deliberations to which they are not 
privy.”); Lee, supra note 273, at 869–70 (noting that directly asking a juror about potential bias 
would have a “patronizing” effect on the juror).  
 294.  See Kittle v. United States, 65 A.3d 1144, 1155 (D.C. 2013) (observing that the Tanner 
shortcomings include a juror’s reluctance to report racial bias before the verdict is reached).  
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they will be barred from providing testimony after the verdict is reached 
under Rule 606(b).295  Providing improved jury instructions to jurors may 
still not cure a defendant’s failure to report juror misconduct prior to the 
verdict.  First, jurors may rationalize racism during deliberations and not 
report it to the court because the juror ultimately agrees with the verdict.296  
Jurors may also be unwilling to confront fellow jurors or report juror 
misbehavior when they may still have to interact with the offending juror for 
the duration of the trial.297  Collectively, the four Tanner safeguards are 
insufficient in the context of racial bias to ensure a defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to an impartial jury in criminal proceedings. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado, the Supreme Court held that post-
verdict juror testimony on racial bias made by a juror during the deliberations 
process is a constitutionally mandated exception under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 606(b) when the juror made a clear statement that shows they relied 
on racial prejudice or animus to convict a defendant.298  The Court correctly 
decided the case because precluding jurors from impeaching their verdicts 
through evidence of racial bias violates an individual’s Sixth Amendment 
right to a fair and impartial jury.299  The Court, however, incorrectly based its 
constitutional exception on the need to address institutional evils of racism in 
the criminal justice system.  Rather, the Court should have created the 
constitutional exception to Rule 606(b) solely because of the Tanner 
safeguards’ inability to protect a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right in the 
context of racial bias during deliberations.300 
                                                          
 295.  Wolin, supra note 210, at 282.  
 296.  See Janet Bond Arterton, Unconscious Bias and the Impartial Jury, 40 CONN. L. REV. 
1023, 1033 (2008) (recounting a juror’s experience in deliberations when other members of the jury 
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